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ABSTRACT 
Sidgwick considered Kant as one of his masters. However, he never devoted any 
systematic attention to Kant’s ethical theory; moreover, in The Methods of Ethics he 
concluded that Kantian ethics is inadequate to guide moral life. I review Sidgwick’s 
references to Kant in order to show that – along with basic differences − there are 
significant similarities in the main project of the two philosophers; and I suggest that, 
should Sidgwick have deepened his understanding of Kant, he might have realised that 
Kantian ethics offered a somewhat different way to accomplish the philosophical project 
he was interested in, that is, the systematisation of the morality of common sense through 
the establishment of certain moral axioms. I also suggest that Sidgwick’s 
misunderstanding of the “formula of humanity” is at the heart of his final dismissal of 
Kant’s ethics and that deepening his understanding of Kant might have led Sidgwick to 
revise his views on the rationality of egoism, thereby opening the possibility to solve the 
dualism of practical reason. Finally, I offer some speculations on the reasons why 
Sidgwick never attempted a thorough confrontation with Kant, suggesting that both his 
distaste for Kant’s metaphysics and his Millian utilitarian bias deterred him from it. 
 
 
 
 
1. A Puzzling Relationship 
 
In the famous autobiographical note added to the sixth edition of The Meth-
ods of Ethics, Sidgwick declares Kant one of «my masters» (ME 7, p. xviii)1 
alongside with Mill; he describes his ethical project as a struggle «to assimi-
late Mill and Kant» (Ibid.), and says that his final reconciliation of utilitari-
                                                          
1 I will use the abbreviations ME 1 and ME 7 to refer to The Methods of Ethics, 1st edition 
(1874) and 7th edition (1907), both quoted from the Thoemmes reprint (Bristol 1996); 
OHE to refer to the Outlines of the History of Ethics (1886), quoted from the Hackett re-
print (Indianapolis 1988); HSM to refer to Henry Sidgwick: A Memoir, by A. Sidgwick, E. 
M. Sidgwick (Macmillan, London 1906); and G to refer to Kant’s Grundlegung, quoted 
from the English translation Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals in I. 
Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason, The Critique of Practical Reason and Other Ethical Trea-
tise and The Critique of Judgment, Encyclopaedia Britannica, Chicago 1952. 
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anism and intuitionism was reached in part through the realisation of the 
«perfect harmony» (ME 7, p. xx) between the Kantian principle and the 
utilitarian one. This late reconstruction is confirmed by a short paper written 
three years after the first publication of The Methods, where he already 
pointed out the centrality of the Kantian element in his ethical viewpoint: «I 
identify a modification of Kantism with the missing rational basis of the 
ethical utilitarianism of Bentham, as expounded by J. S. Mill»2.  Given the 
emphasis with which he includes Kant among the main inspirers of his pro-
ject, it comes as a surprise that Sidgwick never set out, in his long career as a 
philosopher and a university teacher, to address Kant’s ethics with any de-
tailed attention. Indeed, as noted by M. G. Singer, «his failure to come to 
terms adequately with Kant’s ethics may be the most difficult thing to un-
derstand about his approach to ethics and the most serious deficiency in it»3. 
Such failure is particularly puzzling since: i) Sidgwick taught ethics con-
stantly from the ’60s to his death; ii) he devoted considerable attention to 
other influential moral philosophers, such as Bentham, Martineau, Grote, 
Green, Spencer and Stephen; iii) he published a number of essays on Kant’s 
metaphysics and epistemology4, and taught an entire course on the Critique 
of Pure Reason and the Prolegomena5. Why then did Sidgwick — apart from 
some passages in The Methods — never devote to Kant’s ethics more than the 
few pages contained in the Outlines of the History of Ethics?6  
The pages in the Outlines — it must be added — are indeed deeply inade-
quate, considering that Sidgwick could read German, that he was a very re-
markable historian of philosophy, and that his Lectures on the Philosophy of 
Kant are profound and extensive. The brief summary contained in the Out-
                                                          
2 H. Sidgwick, Mr Barratt on ‘The Suppression of Egoism’ (1877), in Essays on Ethics and 
Method, ed. by M. G. Singer, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2000, pp. 27-28, here at p. 
27. One earlier testimony is a 1866 letter in which he declares Kant’s phraseology «quite a 
revelation to me», and, after having censured German Idealism as «a monstrous mistake», 
he concludes that «we must go back to Kant and begin again from him. Not that I feel 
prepared to call myself a Kantian, but I shall always look on him as one of my teachers» 
(HSM, p. 151). 
3 M. G. Singer, A Note on the Content, ibid., p. xlii. 
4 These are: The So-Called Idealism of Kant, «Mind» 1879; Kant’s Refutation of Idealism, 
«Mind» 1880; A Criticism of the Critical Philosophy, part I and II, «Mind» 1883; and 
Kant’s View of Mathematical Premisses and Reasonings, parts I and II, «Mind» 1883. 
5 Lectures on the Philosophy of Kant and Other Philosophical Lectures (1905), Thoemmes 
Press, Bristol 1996. 
6 The 1888 essay on The Kantian Conception of Free Will might here be added, though it in 
fact discusses the metaphysical underpinnings of Kant’s conception, rather than his ethi-
cal theory qua talis. 
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lines, on the contrary, lends itself to criticism on several grounds: i) it never 
mentions the Metaphysics of Morals (though it implicitly refers to it in vari-
ous passages)7; ii) it does not recall the central doctrine of the moral law as a 
fact of reason, stated in the second Critique; iii) it clearly misunderstands 
(OHE, pp. 274-5) the significance of the second formula of the categorical 
imperative (the “formula of humanity”, more on which will be said later); iv) 
it never refers to such central ideas, in the Kantian perspective, as those of 
the autonomy of the will and of a universal kingdom of ends; v) it attributes 
to Kant the view that the belief in a moral government of the world is neces-
sary to motivate moral action — a view Kant holds in the first Critique, from 
which Sidgwick quotes (OHE, p. 276), but repudiates in all his ethical trea-
tises8.  
The lack of a direct confrontation with Kant’s ethical thought clearly has 
to do with Sidgwick’s classification of Kant as an intuitionist, as well as with 
his failure to acknowledge Kant’s as a distinctive method of ethics9. This is 
again very surprising, since Kant’s moral philosophy is doubtless very differ-
ent from those of the British moralists, from Cudworth to Whewell, that are 
the paradigmatic exponents of the polemic target constructed by Sidgwick 
under the heading of “intuitionism” and discussed in Book III of The Meth-
ods. True, it could be argued that Sidgwick did show a certain awareness of 
the fact that Kant is not simply a member of the intuitional school; in fact, 
he writes that we can find «distinct traces of Kantian influence in Whewell 
and other writers of the intuitional school» (OHE, p. 271), and cautiously 
speaks of a particular affinity of Kant with Price (Ibid.; both emphases are 
added): these expressions may suggest that perhaps Sidgwick was not willing 
to rank Kant among the members of the intuitional school tout court. How-
ever he does seem to conflate Kantian ethics and intuitionism throughout 
                                                          
7 E.g. OHE, pp. 274-5. The Doctrine of Virtue is instead quoted repeatedly in The Methods: 
see for example ME 7, III, 9, note 1; ME 7, III, 13, concluding Note and note 15. 
8 The same passage concerning the «glorious ideas of morality» as «objects of applause and 
admiration, but not springs of purpose and action» is quoted as representing the definitive 
Kantian position in the paper read to the Synthetic Society on February 25, 1898 (On the 
Nature of the Evidence for Theism, in HSM, pp. 600-608, at p. 605). The critical judgment 
on the treatment of Kant in OHE may be partly qualified by noting that Sidgwick’s work 
is intended for English readers; for the modern period, in fact, it is «mainly confined to 
English ethics, and only deals with foreign ethical systems in a subordinate way, as 
sources of influence on English thought» (OHE, p. v). Not by chance, the last paragraph 
of the work, where the pages on Kant appear, bears the title “German influence on Eng-
lish ethics”. 
9 As lamented by J. Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, «Journal of Philoso-
phy», 77, 1980, pp. 515-572, at p. 556. 
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The Methods, and explicitly declares Kant an intuitionist in at least one pas-
sage (ME 7, p. 366)10. 
Why Sidgwick never devoted more of his scholarly attention to Kant’s 
moral philosophy is very difficult to investigate; I will be offering my tenta-
tive speculations in § 5. What may perhaps be more confidently said is that, 
should Sidgwick have deepened his understanding of Kant, he might have 
found that: i) Kant’s ethics is not as inadequate to the task of giving «com-
plete guidance» (ME 7, p. xix) to our moral life, as he finally came to believe; 
ii) Kant’s project is much more similar to Sidgwick’s than the latter thought, 
with particular reference to the relationship between ordinary moral knowl-
edge and philosophical ethics. In fact, Kant’s system offers a way of elevat-
ing the Morality of Common Sense into a system of philosophical ethics that 
is different both from the attempts of traditional “intuitional” moralists and 
from Sidgwick’s problematic incorporation of that morality within the utili-
tarian system. I will not venture to say that, should Sidgwick have under-
stood Kant more in depth, he would have become a Kantian; what the fol-
lowing pages are going to suggest is rather that he would have had to choose 
among two alternative ways in which to accomplish his own main project, 
that is, to provide a philosophical defence of the morality of common sense. 
And — for reasons that will emerge in due course — it is not wholly certain 
that he would have chosen the utilitarian one.  
 
 
2. The Relationship between Ordinary Moral Knowledge and Philosophical Eth-
ics 
 
The project of The Methods is deliberately Socratic: through «impartial re-
flection on current opinion» (ME 7, p. xx), Sidgwick tries to bring consistency 
to the Morality of Common Sense of his era, just as Aristotle had done for the 
morality of fifth century B.C. Athens. Sidgwick clearly does not accept 
Common Sense as a definitive authority: he claims that «the aim of a phi-
losopher, as such, [is] to do somewhat more than define and formulate the 
common opinion of mankind. His function is to tell men what they ought to 
think, rather than what they do think» (ME 7, p. 373)11. The aim of moral 
                                                          
10 Another passage explicitly including Kant among the «intuitive moralists» occurred in 
ME 1, p. 303. The passage is modified in the following editions. 
11 The point is perhaps most clearly stated in a later essay: «though I have always been 
anxious to ascertain and disposed to respect the verdict of Common Sense in any ethical 
dispute, I cannot profess to regard it as final and indisputable: I cannot profess to hold 
that it is impossible for me ever to be right on an ethical point on which an overwhelming 
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philosophy is to correct and rationalise the morality of common sense in view 
of a more systematic construction: this can be effected by confronting it with 
genuine intuitions such as the Kantian principle of impartiality, the utilitar-
ian principle of universal benevolence and the principle of rational egoism. 
The upshot of this procedure is well known: the alleged opposition between 
intuitionism and utilitarianism is in fact due to a misunderstanding, while a 
deeper opposition lingers between morality and rational egoism, i.e., the fa-
mous dualism of practical reason.  
I think it important to stress the analogies that this Socratic project bears 
to the procedure followed by Kant, particularly in the Grundlegung — pre-
sumably a book very well known to Sidgwick. What Kant is here trying to do 
is in fact, first, to use the analytic method (see Preface) to extract, from what 
he calls the «common rational knowledge of morality» (“gemeine sittlichen 
Vernunfterkenntnis”, note that for Kant this basic knowledge is already in 
itself rational), the very idea of duty, thus moving to a philosophical knowl-
edge of morality (Section I); second, to search the principles of this philoso-
phical morality, passing from «popular moral philosophy» to the «meta-
physic of morals» (Section II); third, in a synthetic vein, to show that moral-
ity is not a «creation of the brain» but a reality, thus passing from the meta-
physic of morals to the «critique of pure practical reason» (Section III). In 
other words, Kant is in fact assuming that morality exists, and that it is just 
like ordinary people conceive it; what he tries to do is to elucidate the concept 
of it that is implicit in ordinary moral knowledge, before trying to vindicate 
it rationally, by showing how pure reason can be practical.  
The method employed by Kant is in fact different from Sidgwick’s12. Kant 
does not provide a large review of the morality of common sense, in order to 
show both its strengths and its difficulties, as done by Sidgwick; he starts 
with what he considers the implicit understanding of common sense, relative 
to what is unconditionally good — i.e., the good will — and tries to bring out 
what is contained in this idea: that is, the idea of being subject to duty, 
which in turn means being subject to a law of reason that objectively and 
interpersonally constrains the satisfaction of individual inclinations and the 
pursuit of individual and collective happiness. This leads him to single out 
the categorical imperative, in the formula of universal law, as the fundamen-
tal principle of morality, not as a principle needed to systematise the plural-
________________________________________________ 
majority is clearly opposed to me» (H. Sidgwick, Some Fundamental Ethical Controversies 
[1889], in Essays on Ethics and Method, pp. 35-46, here at p. 35).  
12 This contrast is very much emphasized by A. W. Wood, Kantian Ethics, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 2007, pp. 43-65. 
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ity of moral imperatives acknowledged by ordinary moral consciousness, nor 
as one generated by a theorist’s speculations, but as the principle that is or-
dinarily — though implicitly — used by common men; these, of course, do 
not conceive the principle in such an abstract and universal form as pre-
sented by Kant,  
yet they always have it really before their eyes and use it as the standard of 
their decision. Here it would be easy to show how, with this compass in hand, 
men are well able to distinguish, in every case that occurs, what is good, what 
bad, conformably to duty or inconsistent with it, if, without in the least 
teaching them anything new, we only, like Socrates, direct their attention to 
the principle they themselves employ; and that, therefore, we do not need 
science and philosophy to know what we should do to be honest and good, 
yea, even wise and virtuous. Indeed we might well have conjectured before-
hand that the knowledge of what every man is bound to do, and therefore 
also to know, would be within the reach of every man, even the commonest 
(G, pp. 260-261)13. 
In other words, starting from the idea, supposedly acknowledged by com-
mon sense, that the value of an action done from duty stems from its princi-
ple of willing and not from the object it pursues, Kant comes to the conclu-
sion that the principle of «the moral knowledge of common human reason» 
(G, p. 260) — that is, the method used by ordinary men in reaching moral 
conclusions — is the one that tests moral maxims by asking whether they are 
the product of any inclination or are apt to become principles of a universal 
legislation. 
On the contrary, Sidgwick embarks on a large review of the morality of 
common sense, in order to show that it does not provide a systematic con-
struction, since many of its precepts are too vaguely stated and often at odds 
to one another. He then proceeds to extract from that large discussion three 
                                                          
13 As is well known, Rousseau’s influence was decisive for the development of Kant’s ethi-
cal views on this point. In his Notes on his own copy of the Observation on the Feeling of the 
Beautiful and the Sublime, Kant already wrote (in 1765): «I am myself a researcher by in-
clination. I feel the whole thirst for knowledge and the curious unrest to get further on, or 
also the satisfaction in every acquisition. There was a time when I believed that this alone 
could make the honor of humanity and I despised the rabble that knows nothing. Rous-
seau set me right. This dazzling superiority vanishes, I learn to honor man and I would 
find myself more useless than the common labourer if I did not believe that this observa-
tion would impart to all else a value to restore the rights of mankind» (quoted in J. B. 
Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy. A History of Modern Moral Philosophy, Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge 1998, pp. 488-489). 
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or four immediately evident and more formal principles14, that are genuinely 
axiomatic — that is, that are self-evident upon reflection for every rational 
individual — and that he finds partly in the works of past moralists and 
partly implicit in the ordinary way of dealing with moral questions. Armed 
with these principles, he goes on to show that they are able to provide the re-
quired systematisation of the morality of common sense, within the context 
of a revised utilitarian theory15.  
It is not the case that Kant, unlike Sidgwick, meant to withhold initial 
trust from the main normative principles that ordinary moral knowledge as-
sumes to be true. On the contrary, in the Grundlegung, he seems to consider 
the fact that normative conclusions that we generally trust and assume to be 
true — e.g. that suicide is morally wrong, that we should not make promises 
with the intention not to keep them, and so on — can be derived from ab-
stract formulations such as those of the various formulas of the categorical 
imperative as confirming that these formulas are in fact implied in the ordi-
nary processes of moral thinking. Moreover, Kant’s project in the later Meta-
physics of Morals, which is his explicit attempt to construct a system of 
moral duties, is precisely to show the capacity of his philosophical system to 
vindicate most of the particular moral conclusions that were commonsense in 
his days and for his cultural and religious milieu. Kant’s attitude towards the 
morality of common sense is in fact even more positive than Sidgwick’s; he is 
however at least as sceptical as Sidgwick about the previous philosophers’ at-
tempt to provide a philosophical account of such ordinary knowledge. He 
therefore believes that the first philosophical task is to investigate the formal 
processes that are embedded in ordinary moral thinking, in order to establish 
its fundamental principle.  
It might be observed that the difference between the two philosophers lies 
simply in the order in which the different steps are accomplished: Sidgwick 
just postpones the search for more formal principles after the review of com-
mon sense morality’s material principles, but he nonetheless concurs with 
Kant in stressing the need for such principles in order to accomplish the sys-
tematisation that is philosophy’s main task. This is not quite true, for it 
                                                          
14 The question is notoriously controversial as to how many really self-evident principles 
Sidgwick is willing to accept: the figures range from three (H. Rashdall, A Theory of the 
Good and the Right, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1907, vol. I, p. 147) to eight (W. K. 
Frankena, Henry Sidgwick, in Encyclopedia of Morals, ed. by V. Ferm, Philosophical Li-
brary, New York 1956), with four perhaps being the most reasonable answer. 
15 Of course, he also shows the reasons why someone might not want to accept the princi-
ple of universal beneficence, thus confining himself to the narrower view of individual he-
donism; this is what triggers the problem of the «dualism of practical reason».  
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seems to miss one important point: the fact that for Kant the formality of the 
fundamental principle is strictly connected with the formality of his concep-
tion of moral obligation. That is, while both philosophers clearly accept the 
idea that moral imperatives are dictates of rationality, Sidgwick assumes 
that they have to do with bringing about some good: in particular, the “ulti-
mate good on the whole” must be identified with «what as a rational being I 
should desire and seek to realise, assuming myself to have an equal concern 
for all existence» (ME  7, p. 112). On this view, that choice is practically most 
reasonable which brings about the greatest good, however defined16. Kant, on 
the other hand, believes that, from the moral point of view, only a good will 
is unconditionally good, and it is good on account of its principle of willing, 
not on account of its object. Therefore, a deep difference between the two 
projects of vindicating philosophically the morality of common sense lies in 
the different conception of goodness that they assume as implicit in ordinary 
consciousness: on the one side, the idea of goodness as some state of affairs 
that can be produced — and that is eventually identified by Sidgwick with 
some pleasurable state of consciousness; on the other hand, the idea of good-
ness as good will, that is, the disposition to act only on maxims that may be 
conceived and willed as universal laws. 
This basic difference should not prevent us from stressing the affinities be-
tween the two philosophical projects of founding a scientific ethics by giving 
philosophical systematisation and vindication to the morality of common 
sense. The Kantian way of proceeding is in fact doubly consonant to Sidg-
wick’s mind: on the one hand, it shares its Socratic bent, by according serious 
philosophical relevance to the ordinary processes of moral knowledge; on the 
other hand, it clearly denies the sufficiency of ordinary moral knowledge for a 
genuine philosophical system of morality. In fact, while acknowledging that 
the common intellect may often surpass the philosopher in the practical do-
main, Kant declares that, lacking a precise philosophical determination of 
the principle of morality, it is difficult for ordinary wisdom to outdo the in-
clinations; that is, it is practically difficult to overcome the natural «disposi-
tion to argue against these strict laws of duty and to question their validity», 
                                                          
16 Both the axiom of prudence and that of beneficence are formulated by Sidgwick, by us-
ing the formal notion of “good”; they then receive “material” content through the demon-
stration that «Desirable Consciousness» is the only thing that can be considered as ulti-
mate Good (ME 7, p. 397). But these formal readings would not escape Kant’s objection 
that, by prioritising the good over the right, impure and heteronomous elements are in-
troduced in the very concept of morality. 
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with a view, wherever possible, to «make them more accordant with our 
wishes and inclinations» (G, p. 261)17.  
On this account, it seems reasonable to say that Sidgwick might have 
found in Kant one alternative way of developing precisely what he wanted: 
the recognition of both the importance and insufficiency of ordinary moral 
knowledge, along with the philosophical effort to find a fundamental princi-
ple to systematize it18. The importance of the philosophical effort to bring 
systematic order into the ordinary moral knowledge of humanity is especially 
strong in both authors. As for Kant, his passion — or rather his obsession — 
for systematic philosophy, and for the critical foundation of the system of 
science, is too well known to be worth stressing. Let me just recall his obser-
vation that the innocence of practical wisdom is easily seduced; so that, 
«when practical reason cultivates itself, there insensibly arises in it a dialectic 
which forces it to seek aid in philosophy, just as happens to it in its theoretic 
use; and in this case, therefore, as well as in the other, it will find rest no-
where but in a thorough critical examination of our reason» (Ibid.). 
As for Sidgwick, it is perhaps enough to quote a very strong passage from 
the I edition of The Methods, in which his quite rationalistic pretensions, as 
far as the foundation of morals are concerned, are very well voiced: «conduct 
appears to us irrational, or at least imperfectly rational, not only if the max-
ims upon which it is professedly based conflict with and contradict one an-
other, but also if they cannot be bound together and firmly concatenated by 
means of some one fundamental principle. For practical reason does not seem 
to be thoroughly realised until a perfect order, harmony, and unity of system 
is introduced into all our actions»19. Doubtless, it is this epistemological ideal 
that renders Sidgwick’s acknowledgment of the unsolvable dualism of practi-
cal reason so dramatic. He is notoriously emphatic about the uneasiness 
caused in him by the lack of a final foundation, and even considers a modifi-
cation of his epistemology in order to close the gap between duty and happi-
ness. After mentioning his previous willingness to accept a provisional postu-
                                                          
17 Schneewind appropriately stressed Rousseau’s influence on this point as well; in fact, it 
is because human nature has been profoundly corrupted by its historical development, 
that feelings cannot by themselves reliably guide our action, and we need reason (The In-
vention of Autonomy, p. 504). 
18 Borrowing Schneewind’s apt terms, we could say that Kant accepts the “dependence 
argument”, but offers a “systematization argument” different from Sidgwick’s (cf. Sidg-
wick’s Ethics and Victorian Moral Philosophy, pp. 279-285 and 331-336).  
19 ME 1, p. 26 (the passage no longer appears after the second edition). On the strictly 
axiomatic character of Sidgwick’s epistemic model, see J. Deigh, Sidgwick’s Epistemology, 
«Utilitas», 19, 2007, pp. 435-446. 
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lation of immortality, in Kant’s wake, while searching for the empirical evi-
dence of an afterlife, he continues:  
If I decide that this search is a failure, shall I finally and decisively make this 
postulate? Can I consistently with my whole view of truth and the methods 
of its attainment? And if I answer “no” to each of these questions, have I any 
ethical system at all? And if not, can I continue to be Professor and absorb 
myself in the mere erudition of the subject […]. I am nearly forty-nine, and I 
do not find a taste for the old clothes of opinions growing on me (HSM, p. 
467). 
To decisively make the postulate would in fact be to accept the epistemol-
ogy set out in the very last sentence of The Methods, according to which we 
would be justified in accepting as universally true propositions that are 
founded on our strong disposition to affirm them, together with their being 
indispensable to the systematic coherence of our beliefs. It is now a generally 
accepted view that Sidgwick never brought himself to make this postulate20, 
even though he seems to waver significantly on this issue throughout his life: 
two years before his death, he in fact still seemed to consider such postulation 
a very serious possibility. The conclusion of his conference on theism is para-
digmatic of his lingering doubts:  
It seems to me, then, that if we are led to accept Theism as being, more than 
any other view of the Universe, consistent with, and calculated to impart a 
clear consistency to, he whole body of what we commonly agree to take for 
knowledge — including knowledge of right and wrong — we accept it on 
grounds analogous to those on which important scientific conclusions have 
been accepted; and that, even though we are unable to add the increase of 
certitude derivable from verified predictions, we may still attain a sufficient 
strength of reasoned conviction to justify us in calling our conclusion a 
“working philosophy” (HSM, pp. 607-608)21.  
                                                          
20 See for example the discussion in J. L. Mackie, Sidgwick’s Pessimism, «Philosophical 
Quarterly», 105, 1976, pp. 317-327; repr. in B. Schultz (ed.), Essays on Henry Sidgwick, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1992, pp. 163-174. 
21 In the paper on Authority, Scientific and Theological, presented to the Synthetic Society on 
February 24, 1899, he returns on Kant’s practical postulate again with a somewhat more 
sceptical attitude; in fact, «for most minds a belief recognised as assumed merely for prac-
tice is liable to decline to a belief of which there is an intellectual need, but a need that 
does not carry with it its own satisfaction: the satisfaction of the need has to be obtained, 
if at all, through some other line of thought» (HSM, pp. 608-615, here at p. 615). 
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In any case, it must be stressed that his aspirations to a philosophical 
foundation were such that his incapacity to solve this problem amounts for 
him to acknowledging a radical failure; as he confesses in 1887 note, «the rec-
ognised failure of my efforts to obtain evidence of immortality affects me not 
as a Man but as a Moralist» (HSM, pp. 471-472). In fact, while he does not 
feel anxious about the fact that, somehow or other, morality is going to get 
on, he sees clearly that, as a philosopher, his «special business is not to main-
tain morality somehow, but to establish it logically as a reasoned system; and 
I have declared and published that this cannot be done, if we are limited to 
merely mundane sanctions, owing to the inevitable divergence, in this imper-
fect world, between the individual’s Duty and his Happiness» (HSM, p. 
472)22. 
 
 
3. Kant’s search for the fundamental principle and Sidgwick’s misguided critique 
 
Notwithstanding the affinity of the two authors’ philosophical projects and 
some sparse similarities that will be noted in a while, Kant’s moral deontol-
ogy is doubtless very far from Sidgwick’s utilitarianism «on an intuitional 
basis». I have already mentioned the fact that Kant assumes an anti-
teleological notion of goodness at the very start of his philosophical inquiry 
on morality. Differences increase if we look at the development of Kant’s 
fundamental principle, as spelled out in the second section of the 
Grundlegung. Here he distinguishes between hypothetical and categorical 
imperatives, and declares that moral imperatives command categorically. 
This implies that there are true answers to moral questions, that such an-
swers can be found through rational reflection and that they are found by 
keeping such reflection “pure”, that is, by discarding any empirical element, 
including of course the inclination towards certain objects. 
Sidgwick does concur on part of this perspective. For one thing, he accepts 
a form of moral cognitivism, declaring, against the Humean view of reason 
shared by most part of the empiricist tradition, that «what ought to be is a 
possible object of knowledge» (ME 7, p. 33)23. And he intends this in the 
meaning of an objective rationalism, claiming that ethical judgments are 
                                                          
22 This situation even led him to seriously wonder whether he had to resign his position as 
a teacher of ethics; see the 1888 letter in HSM, pp. 484-486. 
23 In the first edition he explicitly accepts the common view according to which «in saying 
that Reason apprehends moral distinctions, it would seem that no more is usually meant 
than that there is such a thing as moral truth and error; that two conflicting judgments as 
to what ought to be done cannot both be true and sound» (ME 1, p. 23). 
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«dictates» or «precepts» of reason, so that «what I judge ought to be must, 
unless I am in error, be similarly judged by all rational beings who judge 
truly of the matter» (Ibid.). Sidgwick’s basic problem with the so called «du-
alism of practical reason» is in fact that, should we abandon the project of 
completely rationalising morality, cases of conflict between self-interest and 
duty would show practical reason as «divided against itself» and unable «to 
be a motive on either side»: the conflict would thus be adjudicated by the 
prevalence of one or the other group of non-rational impulses, and we should 
«lapse to the position which many utilitarians since Hume have avowedly 
held — that ultimate ends are determined by feeling, not by reason»24.  
This being so, it is also clear that Sidgwick does not accept only hypotheti-
cal imperatives, for he believes that reason also has a role in the determina-
tion of the ends, not only of the means. In fact, he distinguishes between 
“moral” and “prudential” judgments, meaning a distinction between «cogni-
tion or judgments of duty» (ME 7, p. 25) and «cognition or judgments as to 
what “is right” or “ought to be done” in view of the agent’s private interest 
or happiness» (ME 7, p. 26). In the first edition, he even went so far as to re-
fer this distinction to the one between an «authoritative, “categorically im-
perative” function of the Practical Reason» and «another in which its opera-
tion is more subordinate, prescribing not the end of the action but only the 
means to a given end. In this latter case the end is determined by desire or 
impulse of some kind, which may or may not be itself rational» (ME 1, p. 24). 
But the Kantian phraseology appears in some passages also in the last edi-
tions, for example where he says he wants to exhibit moral obligation as an 
«unconditional or categorical imperative» (ME 7, p. 35), and where he con-
trasts this categorically imperative interpretation of “ought” with the 
“ought” of the hypothetical imperative (ME 7, p. 37). Moreover, he declares 
that i) certain kind of actions «are commonly held to be right uncondition-
ally, without regard to ulterior results» (Ibid.) and ii) that the same is true 
for the adoption of certain ends, such as the common good or general happi-
ness. Lastly, there is also a very Kantian flavour in what today we would call 
the frank rationalistic internalism of Sidgwick’s moral epistemology: to say 
that ethical judgments are dictates of reason, in fact, is for him also to say 
that «in rational beings as such this cognition gives an impulse or motive to 
action» (ME 7, p. 34), even though not always a predominant one.  
Sidgwick’s acceptance of the very notion of practical reason is indeed very 
rationalistic, anti-Humean, and generally foreign to the empiricist tradition; 
and Schneewind rightly suggested that there is a Kantian strain in Sidgwick’s 
                                                          
24 H. Sidgwick, Some Fundamental Ethical Controversies, p. 44. 
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notion of intuition «as the understanding a rational being has of the nature of 
his own activity as reasonable»25. This is in fact what seems to be implied in 
Sidgwick’s notion that there are certain absolute practical principles, or axi-
oms, «the truth of which, when they are explicitly stated, is manifest» (ME 7, 
p. 379): that, although there is no universal code of moral norms that are un-
conditionally valid for all human beings, there are certain formal principles 
that no rational being can ever deny, for they are, so to speak, consubstantial 
to the rational mind. However, it is also clear that Sidgwick does not accept 
Kant’s specific idea of practical reason, that is, the idea that reason can be 
practical only by being pure, i.e. by putting aside all inclination and every 
other empirical element26. While it is clear that Sidgwick does not think of 
reason as a mere faculty of means, and of judgments as to what is right or 
ought to be done as mere instrumental judgments, it is also evident that, for 
him, the formal requirements of reason do not generate ends independently of 
any inclination; in fact, of the above mentioned absolute practical principles, 
he says that «they are of too abstract a nature, and too universal in their 
scope, to enable us to ascertain by immediate application of them what we 
ought to do in any particular case» (ME 7, p. 379). And he links the uncondi-
tional obligations he admits to the recognition of a universal end at which it 
is ultimately reasonable to aim, so that the obligation must concern acts 
mostly conducive to such end: in this way, he observes, «The obligation is not 
indeed “unconditional”, but it does not depend on the existence of any non-
rational desires or aversions» (ME 7, p. 35). 
As for Kant, in the second section of the Grundlegung he strongly denies 
that happiness can be the source of the fundamental principle of morality, 
even though it is the only end that can be said to be pursued by all rational 
beings; the problem is that the imperatives of happiness command not neces-
sarily, but only assertorially, in that they command something not for itself, 
but for something else, which we naturally will; moreover, such imperatives 
are consilia, rather than praecepta, for it is not possible to determine with 
certainty what will promote the happiness of a rational being at best. So 
Kant concludes that there is «but one categorical imperative, namely, this: 
Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it 
should become a universal law» (G, p. 268).  
                                                          
25 J. B. Schneewind, Sidgwick’s Ethics and Victorian Moral Philosophy, p. 420. 
26 See O. O’Neill, Sidgwick on Practical Reason, «Proceedings of the British Academy», 
109, 2001, pp. 83-89. It could be argued, nonetheless, that Sidgwick’s way of formulating 
the principle of universal benevolence in ME comes close to the purely formal indication of 
the others’ happiness as an end that is at the same time a duty in The Metaphysics of 
Morals II, Intr., V. B. 
  
MASSIMO REICHLIN 
 122
This formula of the universal law is the one that Sidgwick constantly as-
sumes as defining the Kantian position; according to him, the formula ex-
presses the Golden Rule in a philosophically respectable form and gives gen-
eral formulation to the idea of Justice as Impartiality (i.e. «that whatever is 
right for me must be right for all persons in similar circumstances», ME 7, p. 
xvii). Of this formula, however, he also says that it is «inadequate for the 
construction of a system of duties» (Ibid.), and that it does not «settle finally 
the subordination of Self-Interest to Duty» (Ibid.). In other passages — 
though with no direct reference to Kant — he adds that, strictly speaking, 
the effect of this principle «is merely to throw a definite onus probandi on the 
man who applies to another a treatment of which he would complain if ap-
plied to himself» (ME  7, p. 380); and he repeats the charge of insufficiency 
within the context of the administration of law, for «[the principle of impar-
tiality] does not help us to decide what kind of rules should be thus impar-
tially applied; though all admit the importance of excluding from govern-
ment, and human conduct generally, all conscious partiality and ‘respect of 
persons’» (Ibid.). Finally, he observes that the principle must be qualified by 
the belief that, in practice, the action whose maxim is being tested will not be 
widely imitated; otherwise, we should reject maxims such as the one to adopt 
celibacy, for, were it universally applied, it would determine the greatest of 
all crimes, i.e. the disappearance of the human kind. In short, the Kantian 
principle, for Sidgwick, «means no more that that an act, if right for any in-
dividual, must be right on general grounds, and therefore right for some class 
of persons; it therefore cannot prevent us from defining this class by the 
above-mentioned characteristic of believing that the act will remain an ex-
ceptional one» (ME 7, pp. 486-487).  
While these contentions are fundamentally acceptable, a presentation of 
Kant’s ethics, such as the one given by Sidgwick, centring only on this for-
mula is in itself highly doubtful. It is true, of course, that Kant does say that 
«In forming our moral judgement of actions, it is better to proceed always on 
the strict method and start from the general formula of the categorical im-
perative: Act according to a maxim which can at the same time make itself a 
universal law» (G, p. 275). However, it cannot be forgotten that Kant does 
give at least two more formulas of the imperative; moreover, it is not at all 
clear that the “general formula” to which he refers in the passage just quoted 
must be identified with the formula of the universal law. In fact, it is clearly 
more sensible, and even more true to the letter of Kant’s text, to interpret 
the sequence of the three formulations of the categorical imperative not just 
as the repetition of the same principle, but as a development of one central 
idea, progressively viewed from different perspectives. The ideas of humanity 
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as an end in itself, and of autonomy as the universally legislative will of every 
rational being, do in fact add much to the mere non-contradiction of the 
maxims, that is, to the purely formal condition set by the first formula. In 
view of this progressive development, there are serious reasons for the view 
that, when speaking of the “general formula”, Kant is really intending the 
formula of autonomy, that is, the one that, in synthesizing the formula of the 
universal law and that of humanity, constitutes the most complete wording 
of the one fundamental principle27.  
Sidgwick never mentions the formula of autonomy, nor its variant centring 
on the kingdom of ends — not in The Methods nor in the Outlines; and shortly 
discusses the formula of humanity, both in the Outlines and in a long note in 
The Methods.  
In the Outlines, Sidgwick introduces the formula of humanity after recall-
ing Kant’s thesis that ethics, unlike jurisprudence, is concerned with the re-
alisation of internal freedom through the pursuit of rational ends, as opposed 
to the ends of natural inclination. Of Kant’s statement that rational beings 
are ends in themselves, he notes that it is hardly a clear answer to the ques-
tion asking what are the ends of reason. That statement might be interpreted 
as meaning that we should pursue the development of rationality, and there-
fore of morality, in every imperfectly rational being; but Sidgwick rightly 
dismisses this interpretation, since Kant clearly states that it would be a con-
tradiction to promote the others’ perfection: in fact, it is central to the at-
tainment of intellectual and moral perfection that every man should 
autonomously pursue it. While we have a moral duty to cultivate ourselves, 
we cannot be morally bound to bring about others’ perfection28. Having thus 
discarded perfection, Sidgwick sees no other way to interpret the formula of 
humanity than that according to which it commands to aim at the only other 
producible end of which Kant in fact speaks, that is, the happiness of others: 
therefore, everyone «is to help others towards the attainment of those purely 
subjective ends that are determined for each not by reason but by natural in-
clination» (OHE, p. 275).  
In the Note on Kant concluding chapter xiii of Book III29, Sidgwick links 
again the discussion of the formula of humanity to the attempt to establish 
the principle of beneficence. Here he notes that the derivation of this princi-
ple from the formula of universal law is not cogent, since we can clearly con-
                                                          
27 See A. W. Wood, Kantian Ethics, pp. 82-84. 
28 In ME  7, pp. 239-240, Sidgwick tries to show that this Kantian thesis is untenable.  
29 This note replaces the slightly larger discussion that appeared in ME 1, pp. 360-363 as § 
4 of the same chapter XIII. The main passages here referred to are substantially identical. 
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ceive of a man who would prefer not to be aided by others to accepting obli-
gations to aid, or who believed that a maxim of pure egoism is on the whole 
preferable, prudentially speaking. In this context, he expressly says that, for 
Kant, the fact that others are ends in themselves means that «we must rec-
ognise the duty of making their happiness our end» (ME 7, p. 389). Moreover, 
he reconstructs a different line of argument for the same principle, the one 
according to which, for Kant, since no particular object of inclination can be 
constituted as an absolute dictate of reason, only rational beings in them-
selves can be one such unconditional object or end. Then he goes on to criti-
cise this argument, by noting that: i) to say that humanity is a self-subsistent 
end is perplexing, «because by an End we commonly mean something to be 
realised» (ME 7, p. 390); ii) there is a paralogism in saying that Men are ends 
in so far as they are rational and then deriving from this the duty to adopt as 
our ends their subjective, non rational ends: «It is hard to see why, if man as 
a rational being is an absolute end to other rational beings, they must there-
fore adopt his subjective aims as determined by his non-rational impulses» 
(Ibid.). 
I will try to show in the next section that Sidgwick fails to understand the 
concept of humanity as an end in itself; this is not to be identified with a 
principle of beneficence according to which we are to make the subjective 
ends of others our own end, but with that self-subsistent end that grounds 
both our perfect and our imperfect duties towards ourselves and towards 
other (one of this last duties being the duty of beneficence). I will also argue 
that the failure to understand this key concept of Kant’s ethics is at the heart 
of Sidgwick’s substantial dismissal of the Kantian project. 
 
4. The interpretation of the formula of humanity as the key to Sidgwick’s misun-
derstandings 
 
Two points must be stressed in Sidgwick’s interpretation of the formula of 
humanity: the first is that Sidgwick clearly fails to grasp the meaning of the 
phrase “self-subsistent end”. Of course, commonly an end is something to be 
realised; but Kant explicitly says that  
since in the idea of a will that is absolutely good without being limited by any 
condition (of attaining this or that end) we must abstract wholly from every 
end to be effected (since this would make every will only relatively good), it 
follows that in this case the end must be conceived, not as an end to be ef-
fected, but as an independently existing end. Consequently it is conceived 
only negatively, i.e., as that which we must never act against and which, 
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therefore, must never be regarded merely as means, but must in every voli-
tion be esteemed as an end likewise (G, p. 276).  
This conception of an end is perhaps uncommon in ordinary speech, but 
definitely not mysterious, and even standard in philosophical language: a 
self-subsistent end is simply a being already existing, for the sake of which 
something must be done, that is, a being that sets constraints on actions de-
signed to produce any other end. It is not, therefore, an object of production 
but of respect; and humanity is such an end on account of the peculiarity of 
rational nature, that is, because of its capacity to set ends by herself, to have 
freedom and therefore moral agency. The idea of a self-subsistent end is sim-
ply the idea of an already existing source of the value of all ends, i.e., of a be-
ing whose unconditional worth grounds all conditional values. This notion of 
an end is explicitly worked out in Medieval thought, but has its roots in the 
Aristotelian idea of a final cause30; and it is surprising that Sidgwick, who 
knew very well Aristotle’s work, did not grasp the meaning of this traditional 
idea. 
The second point that must be emphasized is that, in commenting on the 
formula of humanity, Sidgwick fails to see that Kant is here after something 
which is central to his own enterprise. The formula, in fact, is not Kant’s 
convoluted and perhaps inconsistent way of establishing the principle of ra-
tional benevolence, as Sidgwick seems to think; rather, it is his attempt to es-
tablish a much more fundamental principle that can be thought of as the ba-
sis of more specific normative principles, and, at the same time, as their limit-
ing condition. Kant is actually giving substance, or matter, to his purely 
formal wording of the categorical imperative, as presented in the formula of 
the universal law. He seems indeed to agree with Sidgwick on the insuffi-
ciency of the formal principle, on its inadequacy for «complete guidance»; 
therefore, he complements it with a material principle, expressing the central 
value implicit in the formula of universality, that is, humanity as the capac-
ity to set ends for oneself. Kant’s principle of humanity therefore plays the 
same structural function as Sidgwick’s universal benevolence, but has a much 
wider scope; it is the underlying principle at the basis of such diverse rules as 
the perfect duties not to commit suicide and not to make false promises, and 
                                                          
30 The origin of Kant’s phrase is traced by A. Donagan in the double notion of finis present 
both in Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus (see Human Ends and Human Actions: 
An Exploration in St. Thomas’s Treatment, Aquinas Lecture Series, Marquette University 
Press, Milwaukee 1985; repr. in Id., Reflections on Philosophy and Religion, Oxford Univer-
sity Press, Oxford 1999, pp. 81-97). Aristotle’s main passage for the same idea occurs in 
the very famous chapter 7 of Book XII of the Metaphysics (1072a-1073a).  
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the imperfect duties to cultivate one’s perfection and to pursue others’ hap-
piness; at the same time, it is the ground of the constraints on the imperfect 
duties. The road that leads Kant to this principle, as we saw, is different from 
the one followed by Sidgwick: while Sidgwick reaches the maxim of universal 
benevolence by showing that it is somehow implied in the ordinary rules and 
duties that he discusses in detail, Kant starts with the ordinary conception of 
good will and duty, showing that it implies both the idea of a universal legis-
lation and of the autonomy of rational beings. Both philosophers, however, 
are looking for deeper principles, fundamental axioms or “intuitions”, that 
can firmly concatenate practical maxims and adjudicate conflicts between 
them; and both understand such principles as expressing the fundamental 
nature of reason, and therefore as deeply embedded in our nature as rational 
beings. 
What Sidgwick completely fails to see is therefore that the formula of hu-
manity is the second step in the working out of the fundamental principle of 
Kant’s ethics: this principle, in fact, is not — pace Sidgwick and most other 
commentators — the mere formal requirement that maxims should be uni-
versalisable31. Kant himself declares that maxims must have a matter or end; 
however, all material ends are relative and give rise only to hypothetical im-
peratives. Therefore, the source of a practical law, that is, of a categorical 
imperative, cannot be but in something whose existence has in itself an abso-
lute worth, for «if all worth were conditioned and therefore contingent, then 
there would be no supreme practical principle of reason whatever» (G, p. 
272). This something, which is rational nature in humans and other rational 
beings, is therefore an end, not in the sense of something to be produced, but 
in that of something to be respected that gives matter or content to the pure 
formality of a universal law: by rendering them moral beings, that is, capable 
of acting on the basis of the representation of a law, such matter or content in 
fact grounds the dignity of human beings, which, for Kant, cannot be re-
placed by something equivalent, for it is the source of all relative values, both 
of market values and of fancy values.  
It is therefore correct to say that the formula of the universal law is insuf-
ficient for the construction of a whole system of duties; as Sidgwick notes, 
«all (or almost all) persons who act conscientiously could sincerely will the 
maxims on which they act to be universally adopted: while at the same time 
we continually find such persons in thoroughly conscientious disagreement as 
to what each ought to do in a given set of circumstances» (ME 7, p. 210). The 
                                                          
31 This point is very well developed by A. Wood, Kant’s Ethical Thought, Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, Cambridge 1999, pp. 182-190. Cf. Id., Kantian Ethics, pp. 85-95. 
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criterion of universalisability is a necessary but insufficient condition of mo-
rality, just because that formula is not the whole of Kant’s fundamental 
principle. The principle is completely spelled out only when it is shown that 
all moral maxims, that is, all the maxims that can be justified from the moral 
point of view, have i) a form, i.e. universality; ii) a matter or end, i.e. rational 
nature as «the condition limiting all merely relative and arbitrary ends» (G, 
p. 275); and iii) «A complete characterization of all maxims by means of that 
formula, namely, that all maxims ought by their own legislation to harmo-
nize with a possible kingdom of ends as with a kingdom of nature» (Ibid.). 
The third condition, which sums up the first two formulas through the idea 
of autonomy and of a kingdom of ends, is that every maxim should aim at a 
systematic connection of rational beings in a sort of kingdom; such a king-
dom is defined by the fact that everyone is at the same time a legislator and 
subject to laws (i.e. universal objective principles) devised to treat everyone 
not as a means only but always at the same time as an end; this is the final 
and really complete formulation of Kant’s fundamental principle — a formu-
lation to which Sidgwick never makes reference throughout his work. 
Understanding the role of the formula of humanity in the context of 
Kant’s ethical system also helps to solve the specific problem posed by Sidg-
wick with reference to the rule of benevolence. In fact, the formula of human-
ity is in the first place a limitative condition on the acceptability of maxims; 
its main practical effect is to reject maxims that would allow treating ra-
tional beings as mere means for others’ ends. Moreover, the formula has posi-
tive implications in suggesting the adoption of the two ends that, according 
to The Metaphysics of Morals, are at the same time duties: one’s perfection 
and others’ happiness, that is, the duties that in the Grundlegung appeared 
as examples of the imperfect duties towards oneself and towards others32. 
When we come to the positive part, however, we must not forget that ra-
tional beings are considered as ends in themselves qua rational. Therefore, 
while limiting oneself to withholding disrespectful actions would be to value 
rational nature too poorly, only in a negative fashion, adopting others’ sub-
jective ends is always constrained by the moral non-rejectability of such 
ends: when Kant says that «the ends of any subject which is an end in him-
self ought as far as possible to be my ends also» (G, p. 273), the possibility of 
                                                          
32 It may plausibly be contended that the notion of the two ends that are at the same time 
duties, put forth in the Metaphysics of Morals, constitutes a real development with respect to 
the Grundlegung, where in fact this notion does not appear. However, the development may 
be interpreted as the working out in detail of the practical impact of the more abstract prin-
ciple of the Grundlegung. On this issue see D. Tafani, Il fine della volontà buona in Kant, in L. 
Fonnesu (ed.), Etica e mondo in Kant, il Mulino, Bologna 2008, pp. 145-163. 
  
MASSIMO REICHLIN 
 128
which he is speaking is moral, not merely physical. In fact, in the later Meta-
physics of Morals, he says that love is a maxim of benevolence, resulting in 
beneficence, this consisting in «the duty to make others’ ends my own (pro-
vided only that these are not immoral)»33. In other words, respecting rational 
nature in any individual does include promoting those contingent ends that 
make up her life project and from which she can expect her happiness; but i) 
this is not the main meaning of such respect, and ii) this promotion is in any 
case constrained by the prior acceptability of those ends34. 
Sidgwick is therefore wrong when he points to the almost complete coinci-
dence (ME 7, p. 385) between Kantian ethics and utilitarianism, based on the 
fact that «the only really ultimate end which he [i.e. Kant] lays down is the 
object of Rational Benevolence as commonly conceived–the happiness of 
other men» (ME 7, p. 386)35. Actually, not only does Kant add the other im-
perfect duty to cultivate one’s intellectual and moral perfection; but Sidg-
wick also forgets that the duty of beneficence, as well as that of perfection, is 
limited by the negative part of the respect for rational nature as an end in it-
self. Kantian beneficence is therefore significantly unlike utilitarian one, for 
it is not the unlimited pursuit of others’ subjective aims, as determined by 
their natural inclinations, but the pursuit of those subjective aims that pass 
the scrutiny of rational reflection, that is, that are not to be rejected on the 
basis of the two tests of universalisability and non-exploitation. The differ-
ence between Kantian and utilitarian beneficence was not grasped by Sidg-
wick, because he did not really understand the notion of a self-subsistent end, 
nor the role of the formula of humanity as a fundamental axiom or principle 
grounding those of perfection and benevolence, and not reducible to the last 
                                                          
33 I. Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1996, Doc-
trine of the Elements of Ethics, § 25, p. 199. 
34 It must be noted that Sidgwick’s interpretation of the formula of humanity has shaped 
its understanding by many contemporary commentators: paradigmatically, it is adopted 
by R. M. Hare, Could Kant Have Been A Utilitarian?, in Sorting Out Ethics, Oxford Uni-
versity Press, Oxford 1997, pp. 147-165. In this same perspective, M. Nakano-Okuno re-
cently went so far as to affirm not only that «this formula shares essentially the same 
claim as the Principle of Rational Benevolence», but also that it «encompasses the essen-
tial claim of Sidgwick’s Principle of Rational Prudence», since it imposes to treat one’s 
future ends as they were present (Sidgwick and Kant: On the So-Called “Discrepancies” Be-
tween Utilitarian and Kantian Ethics, in P. Bucolo, R. Crisp, B. Schultz [eds.], Henry 
Sidgwick: Happiness and Religion, Dipartimento di Scienze Umane, Università degli Studi 
di Catania, Catania 2007, pp. 260-333, here at p. 292 and p. 294). 
35 In a passing note of the first edition, he even committed himself to such an absurdity as 
to say that «in fact, as we have seen, [the utilitarian first principle] is the first principle of 
Kantism» (ME 1, p. 440). 
  
Ordinary Moral Knowledge and Philosophical Ethics in Sidgwick and Kant 
 129
one. Moreover, he could not realise the resources of the formula of humanity 
in adjudicating between conflicting grounds of duty: in fact, the formula 
clearly seems to justify a relative priority of perfect duties over imperfect 
ones, while leaving the last word to the exercise of judgment in the circum-
stances36. Finally, it is Sidgwick’s failure to understand and to accept such 
notions as humanity as an end in itself, human dignity and moral autonomy 
that explains one of the most critical points of his ethical views, probably the 
one most often quoted in recent debate: his refusal to link moral reasonable-
ness to the demands of publicity, and his consequent acceptance of utilitari-
anism as an esoteric morality reserved to the enlightened few37. While both 
philosophers emphasize the role of ordinary moral knowledge, Kant is in fact 
much more open-minded and ‘progressive’ in his recognition of the intellec-
tual and moral competence of ordinary people; though he does not bring out 
all the consequences of his notion of morality as self-governance, his ideas of 
humanity and human dignity made him stand well over Sidgwick’s still elit-
ist morality. In the end, as noted by Schultz, the strongest difference between 
the two thinkers perhaps lies in the fact that it is hard «to find in Sidgwick’s 
idea of a method of ethics an effectively Kantian endorsement of the plain 
person’s capacity for moral self-direction»38. The reason of this difference 
probably lies in the different historical and cultural contexts of the two phi-
losophers: while Kant, who wrote in the age of Enlightenment and in the 
context of the hopes generated by the American and French revolutions, had 
moderately optimistic views on history and the potentialities of human de-
velopment, Sidgwick can be considered a sort of critic of the Enlightenment, 
and his elitist conclusion is the effect of the disbelief in any optimistic phi-
losophy of history and in the reality of moral human progress.  
 
                                                          
36 This seems to be implicit in the very tentative casuistry sketched by Kant in The Meta-
physics of Morals. Also the Lectures on Ethics often testify to a somewhat more flexible at-
titude (even as far as truth-telling is concerned) on immediately practical matters than is 
generally thought.  
37 B. Schultz appropriately notes that «it is perhaps at this juncture that one can best ap-
preciate how Sidgwick parted from the Kantian project» (Henry Sidgwick: Eye of the Uni-
verse. An Intellectual Biography, Cambridge University Press, New York 2004, p. 264). The 
centrality of the idea of publicity is particularly stressed, in a Kantian and anti-utilitarian 
vein, by J. Rawls, Political Liberalism, Columbia University Press, New York 1993, pp. 
66-71. The charge that Sidgwick’s esoterism amounts to “Government House” utilitarian-
ism is notoriously put forward by B. Williams, The Point of View of the Universe: Sidgwick 
and the Ambitions of Ethics, in Making Sense of Humanity and Other Philosophical Papers, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1995, pp. 153-171. 
38 Henry Sidgwick: Eye of the Universe, pp. 267-268. 
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5. Two speculations 
 
Sidgwick’s avowed incomprehension of both the formula of humanity and 
the third formula (autonomy/kingdom of ends) is the key to understanding 
his final rejection of Kant’s system, and his interpretation of Kant as an intu-
itionist39: this incomprehension explains his purely formalistic reading and 
his strategy to complement the formal principle of universalisability (justice, 
or impartiality) with the substantive principle of rational benevolence.  
A further problem remains, as to why Sidgwick never tried to deepen his 
understanding of the whole Kantian project in ethics. On this, no more than 
speculations may be offered. 
One tentative answer might be that Sidgwick was deeply convinced of the 
untenability of Kant’s theoretical philosophy, and that this conviction de-
terred him from embarking in a serious study of Kant’s ethics. There is in 
fact at least one passage in the Lectures on the first Critique in which Sidg-
wick stresses the uncomfortable consequences of Kant’s epistemology for eth-
ics. Speaking of the ideality of time in the transcendental aesthetics, he notes 
that this doctrine has the effect of rendering intellectual and moral progress 
mere appearances:   
Hence the conception of moral progress, on which the practical postulate of 
immortality — as we saw — is based, is a conception that represents no real 
fact of any soul’s existence, but merely an appearance due to the imperfec-
tion of its faculty of cognition. But if moral progress is thus reduced to mere 
appearance, what becomes of the belief in the immortality of the soul which 
Kant (in the Critique of Practical Reason) bases on it? Indeed, in any case, if 
Time is merely a form of human sensibility, — due to an imperfection of 
man’s nature which prevents him from knowing things as they are, — the 
postulate of immortality seems to become a postulate for the endless con-
tinuance of an imperfection. It does not seem that this can afford an inspiring 
hope for a truth-loving mind40.  
                                                          
39 It is curious that Sidgwick never puts any emphasis on the only passage lending true 
credibility to an intuitionist reading of Kant: the passage in the second Critique speaking 
of the moral law as a “fact of reason”. To my knowledge, Sidgwick never mentions that 
passage in his works; most of his references to Kant are to the Grundlegung, and certainly 
the second Critique is never mentioned in The Methods, but for a note in passing at the be-
ginning of the last chapter of ME 1, p. 439 — a note that was subsequently removed. 
40 Lectures on the Philosophy of Kant, p. 36. 
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And although he adds that, in his practical philosophy, Kant seems to de-
fend a sort of noumenal freedom of the soul, according to which «the momen-
tous choice between good and evil which every human soul makes is in reality 
not subject to the condition of time, so that any change that may appear in a 
man’s character is illusory»41, it is clear that in either way the metaphysical 
underpinnings of Kant’s position were deeply uninviting for Sidgwick.  
This explanation, however, is far from satisfying. For one thing, it is un-
clear why Sidgwick, as an historian of philosophy, should not have wished to 
deepen his understanding of Kant’s moral doctrine, as he had done with the 
epistemological ones, even knowing that it was based on metaphysical 
grounds utterly unpalatable for him. Moreover, Sidgwick might well have 
done with the notions of humanity, autonomy and the kingdom of ends what 
he had done with the notion of universalisability: that is, to accept what he 
found useful in the normative principle, while discarding its theoretical un-
derpinnings. This is in fact how he describes his attitude in the auto-
biographical note: «What commended itself to me, in short, was Kant’s ethi-
cal principle rather than its metaphysical basis» (ME 7, p. xvii). 
Another possible explanation is that Sidgwick approached Kant’s ethics 
with a serious bias deriving from his previous acceptance of Mill’s utilitarian-
ism, and that, although he subsequently tried to revise his first impression by 
rereading Kant, he never fully succeeded in developing an unbiased analysis. 
Owing to the prejudices he had inherited from Mill, he never got convinced of 
the necessity of a deeper understanding of Kant’s ethical project, and this 
may explain the lack of a direct confrontation with it. In other words, Sidg-
wick started as a utilitarian and never ceased to be one; the difficulties he 
found in the theoretical frameworks of the masters of his school led him to 
reappraise the importance of common sense morality, as well as of authors 
such as Kant, Clarke and Butler: but he never ceased to think of utilitarian-
ism, however revised, as the most satisfactory moral theory (at least, faute de 
mieux). So, he wanted to be a utilitarian — perhaps just as he wanted to be a 
Christian, though he carried out the latter endeavour less successfully,— and 
tried what he could in order to rescue utilitarianism from its defects; perhaps 
this attitude was also suggested by the Millian conviction that utilitarianism 
was the theory associated with moral and social progress, while all other 
theories were, in some way or other, conservative.  
This explanation might be not particularly respectful of Sidgwick intellec-
tual honesty; however, it has some textual evidence in its favour. Not only 
Sidgwick does start his auto-biographical note declaring that he adhered to 
                                                          
41 Ibid., p. 37. 
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Mill’s utilitarianism from the start; he also adds that, in his subsequent 
search for a deeper foundation of ethics, he retained a general «attitude of 
discipleship to Mill» (ME 7, p. xvi); he says that «through all this search for 
principles I still adhered for practical purposes to the doctrine I had learnt 
from Mill» (ME 7, p. xviii); and he explicitly declares that the first time he 
read Kant, he read it «somewhat unintelligently, under the influence of Mill’s 
view as to its grotesque failure» (ME 7, p. xvii). True, he also adds that he re-
read it «more receptively» (Ibid.), discovering the importance of its funda-
mental principle. However, it is clear that even this second reading was in 
fact influenced by Mill: the idea of Kant’s ethics as a merely formalistic sys-
tem, and the neglect of the second and third formulas on which it is based, 
though commonsense in most philosophical literature, are central in Mill’s 
reading; and the idea that the only end laid down by Kant through his im-
perative is rational benevolence is also near to the main tenet of Mill’s inter-
pretation. In the passage on the «grotesque failure» of Kant’s ethics quoted 
by Sidgwick, Mill says that the only contradiction that the test of universal-
isability is able to detect is the one between certain immoral rules of conduct 
and the general desires of humanity; that is, the Kantian principle is mean-
ingful, and able to justify duties of morality, only if interpreted in consequen-
tialist terms, as rejecting the maxims on account of their consequences. 
Moreover, in the other passage of Utilitarianism in which Kant is mentioned, 
Mill says that the only meaningful sense of Kant’s fundamental principle is 
that «we ought to shape our conduct by a rule which all rational beings 
might adopt with benefit to their collective interest»42; here again Mill inter-
prets what Kant intends as an a priori constraint on moral maxims as a con-
cern for the consequences of moral rules. Sidgwick’s misunderstanding of 
Kant is similar: he likewise fails to appreciate the fruitfulness of the categori-
cal imperative, in its three progressive formulations, and insists that it does 
not justify any moral rule per se, though it is the first step in the process of 
justifying the utilitarian principle of rational benevolence. In short, notwith-
standing his testimony that he reread Kant’s ethics «more receptively», 
Sidgwick seems to have been receptive only to the possibility of incorporating 
the Kantian idea of the universality of morality into the utilitarian system; 
that is, he complemented Mill’s attempt to show the compatibility of Kant’s 
                                                          
42 J. S. Mill, Utilitarianism (1861), in The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Volume X - 
Essays on Ethics, Religion, and Society, edited by J. M. Robson, University of Toronto 
Press, Toronto 1985, pp. 205-260, here at p. 249. The passage on Kant’s failing «almost 
grotesquely» is at p. 207. 
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ethics and utilitarianism, a compatibility that embodies a misunderstanding 
of Kant very similar to Mill’s.  
 
 
6. Conclusive remarks 
 
My main contention has been that Sidgwick did not fully grasp the heart of 
Kant’s moral project. This means that he did not have the opportunity to 
discover that Kant’s ethics was much more congenial to his mature thought 
on ethics than he assumed, and also that, for certain aspects, it was much less 
conservative than most “dogmatic intuitionism”; in short, he did not have 
the opportunity to consider an alternative and plausible way to accomplish 
the philosophical task that he considered decisive. This far, we have not sug-
gested that, should Sidgwick have understood Kant more deeply, he would 
have taken up the Kantian way, or that he could have been (some sort of) a 
Kantian. It is of course possible, and indeed likely, that Sidgwick’s prior ac-
ceptance of a strictly teleological conception of ethics, according to which for 
an action to be morally appropriate is to maximally promote some good, 
would have prevented him from accepting both Kant’s general theory and 
more specific ideas such as the conception of beneficence. 
However, we can also consider some aspects that may have recommended 
to him the Kantian solution. The first point to consider is that the deonto-
logical conception prioritising the right over the good seems to be embedded 
in the morality of common sense in a way that the one-sided utilitarian insis-
tence on consequences seems not. Of course, there are cases in which utilitari-
anism can be easily accorded with our considered judgments; but the central 
cases discussed by Sidgwick in Book III, those that are the traditional object 
of the utilitarian polemic, are not of this sort. Let us take the classical exam-
ple of promises. Throughout his discussion, Sidgwick basically aims at show-
ing that common sense is in many case uncertain as to the boundaries of the 
duty to keep promises. However, he clearly, though implicitly, acknowledges 
that the traditional casuistry — such as it had been revived and systematised 
by Whewell43 — had defined several precise conditions for the treatment of 
hard cases, such as that a promise is binding «if the promiser has a clear be-
lief as to the sense in which it was understood by the promisee, and if the lat-
ter is still in a position to grant release from it, but unwilling to do so, if it 
was not obtained by force or fraud, if it does not conflict with definite a priori 
obligations, if we do not believe that its fulfilment will be harmful to the 
                                                          
43 W. Whewell, Elements of Morality, Including Polity, III edition, Parker, London 1854. 
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promisee, or will inflict a disproportionate sacrifice on the promiser, and if 
circumstances have materially changed since it was made» (ME 7, p. 311). 
Nowhere does this traditional treatment refer to the mere balance of good 
versus bad consequences in order to solve particular problems; on the con-
trary, it always keeps to the deontological intuition according to which prin-
cipled, a priori solutions, not mere cost-benefit analyses, are needed also for 
hard cases. Here, as in other cases, Sidgwick’s thesis that common sense lacks 
clear answers is perhaps right, but the same cannot be said of the systems of 
intuitionist philosophers such as Whewell, whose solutions Sidgwick simply 
omits to discuss44; his conclusion that precise duties can be defined, and con-
flicts of duties resolved, only by reference to the principle of utility, is there-
fore unwarranted. Moreover, to expect that the application of the principle of 
utility would bring to the treatment of promises much more definition and 
“scientific” precision than afforded by traditional casuistry is both to require 
from moral philosophy much more than it is legitimate (witness the same Ar-
istotle that Sidgwick is imitating) and to overstate the utilitarian ability to 
predict specific consequences in particular cases. Finally, on the basis of his 
alleged aim to provide a philosophical foundation for the morality of com-
mon sense, Sidgwick himself ought have been sympathetic to the efforts of 
ethical theories that tried to treat hard cases and alleged conflicts of duties 
without giving up the deontological intuitions at the heart of ordinarily ac-
knowledged duties: if not Kant’s, at least the more philosophically refined 
formulations of the so-called “intuitionistic theory”, such as Whewell’s. But 
Kant’s theory, correctly understood, offered precisely what Sidgwick was 
looking for: a philosophical principle, developed in the three stages spelled 
out in the Grundlegung, that can both systematise the rules of common sense 
morality and provide principled ways to adjudicate conflicts between them. 
The second point to consider is the conflict between happiness and duty, 
that is, what Sidgwick styled the dualism of practical reason, and what he 
considered the most serious problem of ethics. Sidgwick’s dissatisfaction with 
Kant’s solution to this problem is well known; in a passage of the Memoir al-
ready mentioned, he recalls that, when writing The Methods, he was «inclined 
to hold with Kant that we must postulate the continued existence of the soul, 
in order to effect that harmony of Duty with Happiness which seemed to me 
                                                          
44 On Sidgwick’s unfairness in pointing to the difficulties of the morality of common sense 
in treating with hard cases without seriously discussing the philosophical efforts developed 
to bring consistency and systematisation to it, see A. Donagan, Sidgwick and Whewellian 
Intuitionism: Some Enigmas, «Canadian Journal of Philosophy», 7, 1977, pp. 447-465; 
repr. in B. Schultz (ed.), Essays on Henry Sidgwick, cit., pp. 123-142, and S. Cremaschi, 
Nothing to Invite or Reward a Separate Examination. Sidgwick and Whewell, in this issue. 
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indispensable to rational moral life. At any rate I thought I might provision-
ally postulate it, while setting out on the serious search for empirical evi-
dence» (HSM, p. 467). Such empirical evidence should have come from the 
parapsychological investigations to which Sidgwick devoted much efforts 
throughout his life. In 1874 his hopes had probably already weakened enough 
to make the Kantian postulation unacceptable: in fact, in the first edition of 
The Methods, he already declares what we also find in all other editions, that 
is, that he could not  
fall back on the Kantian resource of thinking myself under a moral necessity 
to regard all my duties as if they were commandments of God, although not 
entitled to hold speculatively that any such Supreme Being really exists “as 
Real”. I am so far from feeling bound to believe for purposes of practice what 
I see no ground for holding as a speculative truth, that I cannot even con-
ceive the state of mind which these words seem to describe, except as a mo-
mentary half-wilful irrationality, committed in a violent access of philosophic 
despair (ME 1, p. 471; cf. ME 7, p. 507).  
The process of disillusion had been (almost) completed by 1887, when he 
writes: «I have been facing the fact that I am drifting steadily to the conclu-
sion — I have by no means arrived at it, but I am certainly drifting towards 
it — that we have not, and are never likely to have, empirical evidence of the 
existence of the individual after death» (HSM, p. 466). Lacking any such evi-
dence, Sidgwick seems to be totally bereft of reasons to accept Kant’s postu-
lation. 
Sidgwick might have solved the dualism of practical reason only by ques-
tioning the rationality of egoism, which he clearly was not quite prepared to 
do. As he makes clear in a 1889 paper, such rationality is based on the reality 
and fundamentality of the distinction between any one individual and any 
other, so that «’I’ am concerned with the quality of my existence as an indi-
vidual in a sense, fundamentally important, in which I am not concerned 
with the quality of the existence of other individuals»45; it is in fact based on 
the very idea of the «separateness of persons» urged by Rawls against utili-
tarianism. For Sidgwick, this preference of private happiness to virtue, or 
general happiness, is just as much a dictate of reason as the proposition that 
my own good is no more important than the good of any other; for Kant, the 
demands of reason are in no way conditioned to the effective reconciliation of 
happiness and virtue, which must be postulated and hoped for, but cannot be 
the motive of action: morality teaches us how to become deserving of happi-
                                                          
45 H. Sidgwick, Some Fundamental Ethical Controversies, p. 44. 
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ness, without assuring that we will actually be happy. In the end, persons are 
for Sidgwick much more separate than they are for Kant. In fact, thanks to 
his identification of reason with the very capacity for universality, Kant can 
question the rationality of egoism; to be rational is in fact to acknowledge 
that maxims by which we are making exceptions for ourselves are not justifi-
able46. Persons are thus separate, but practical reason is a point of view with 
which all human beings can identify themselves, a common identity rooted in 
their nature as rational beings. For Sidgwick, instead, the rationality of over-
coming egoism can only be seen by viewing things from the point of view of 
the universe; this, however, is actually no one’s point of view: it is not a per-
spective rooted in our nature as the first person perspective that grounds ra-
tional egoism. This account seems to emphasize the separateness of persons 
more than the Kantian one, for here the viewpoint of universality seems not 
one that is shared by all, but one to be constructed by summing the perspec-
tives of all; in this perspective, the concern with «the quality of my exis-
tence» cannot but trump any interest for universal benevolence.   
In conclusion, there are some reasons that may suggest that a deeper un-
derstanding of Kant and a more direct confrontation with Kant’s ethical 
treatises might have led Sidgwick to second thoughts on ethics, the rational-
ity of egoism, and his final rejection of the deontological stance of the moral-
ity of common sense. It is a fact, however, that Sidgwick never embarked in 
such a confrontation: and my speculations on the possible reasons for this cir-
cumstance lead to single out both his distaste for Kant’s metaphysics and his 
Millian utilitarian bias47. 
 
 
                                                          
46 Kant’s dualism between instrumental and moral rationality is therefore very different 
from Sidgwick’s dualism (and from other dualisms recalled by Sidgwick), as was shown by 
W. K. Frankena, Sidgwick and the History of Ethical Dualism, in B. Schultz (ed.), Essays 
on Henry Sidgwick, pp. 175-198. 
47 I wish to thank Sergio Cremaschi and Gianfranco Pellegrino for very helpful comments 
on an earlier draft.  
